This paper provides the first serious attempt to examine the relationship between political risk and capital flight for a large set of developing countries. The outcomes of the analysis show that in most cases political risk variables do have a statistically robust relationship to capital flight once domestic and international macroeconomic circumstances are added, at least when the robustness test as proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997) is applied. We conclude that on the basis of the analysis in this paper we have found support for the hypothesis that political risk leads to increased capital flight. * Please, send all your comments to Robert Lensink, The authors thank Jakob de Haan and an anonymous referee of the Journal of International Money and Finance for constructive suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this paper. We thank Jan Egbert Sturm for writing the computer programme that enabled us to run the econometric tests.
Introduction
The capital flight problem has been examined quite extensively in the literature.
In addition to discussing the concept and measurement of capital flight 1 , several studies have investigated the determinants of the phenomenon. The studies emphasize the factors that determine capital flight, in terms of the impact of these factors on the domestic "investment climate" (Pastor, 1990, p.7) . The stylized argument is that residents decide to invest their wealth abroad due to an adverse domestic investment climate, or because economic agents consider it too risky to invest domestically. According to this argument, variables that have been found to cause capital flight include overvalued exchange rates, high domestic inflation rates, government budget deficits, the domestic versus the international interest rate differential, and capital inflows. Thus, these variables measure the economic aspects of an adverse domestic investment climate.
Many observers suggest that political instability and uncertainty are particularly important in explaining the flight of capital: residents faced with such instability and uncertainty take their money and run to avoid the possibility that the government may in one way or another erode the future value of their asset holdings. What is amazing, therefore, is that in the literature on capital flight there has been no systematic investigation of the impact of political factors on the extent of the capital flight phenomenon. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. It makes use of data sets available for political variables to investigate the relationship between capital flight and political instability and uncertainty in developing countries. The paper makes one important additional contribution: it is the first attempt to analyse the determinants of capital flight for a large set of developing countries. All other empirical studies investigate the issue for individual countries (Cuddington, 1986, for Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina; Mikkelsen, 1991, for Mexico; Vos, 1990 , for the Philippines), or for certain groups or regions of countries (Pastor, 1990, and Ketkar and Ketkar, 1989, for Latin America; Mikkelsen, 1991 , for a set of 22 developing countries;
Hermes and Lensink, 1992 and Murinde, Hermes and Lensink, 1996, for Sub-Saharan African countries; and Hermes, Lensink and Murinde, 1998, for Eastern European countries).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the concept and measurement of capital flight. Section 3 presents summary statistics on the magnitude of capital flight for developing countries. Section 4 gives the main estimation results of the determinants of capital flight of developing countries. Section 5 contains the summary and conclusions.
Measurement of Capital Flight
Capital flight is a rather slippery concept: several interpretations have been given of what exactly is meant by the term. Usually, capital flight is related to the existence of high uncertainty and risk with respect to returns on domestically held assets. Residents take their money and run in order to avoid extremely high expected losses on their asset holdings. It is sometimes argued that capital outflows based on these considerations should be viewed as abnormal, and should therefore be distinguished from normal capital outflows, since normal outflows are based on considerations of portfolio diversification of residents, and/or activities of domestic commercial banks aiming at acquiring or extending foreign deposit holdings (Deppler and Williamson, 1987, p.41 ). Yet, when measuring capital flight it appears to be very difficult to empirically distinguish between normal and abnormal capital outflows.
It may come, therefore, as no surprise that several different capital flight measures are available in the existing literature. Inevitably, these measures lead to differences in capital flight estimates. However, the following three main methods of measuring capital flight can be distinguished in the literature. First, several studies measure capital flight indirectly from balance of payments statistics by comparing the sources of capital inflows (i.e. net increases in external debt and the net inflow of foreign investment) with the uses of these inflows (i.e. the current account deficit and additions to foreign reserves). If the sources exceed the uses of capital inflows, the difference is termed as capital 2 flight. This is the so-called residual method. It has been the most widely used measure in the available literature. The method acknowledges the difficulties of separating abnormal from normal capital outflows and, therefore, measures all private capital outflows as being capital flight. Several variations on the measure have appeared in the literature, among them World Bank (1985) , Morgan Guaranty (1986) and Cline (1987). 2 Second, some authors measure capital flight by adding up net errors and omissions and non-bank private short-term capital outflows (Cuddington, 1986; Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1993) . This measure reflects the idea that capital flight goes unrecorded, due to the illegal nature of these capital movements. It is argued that the unrecorded capital movements appear in the net errors and omissions. Moreover, by concentrating on short-term flows, medium-and longterm outflows are excluded, which according to these authors are more normal in character (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1993, p.146) . This measure is referred to as the hot money method. Capital flight measured in this way refers to short-term movements of capital, whereas the residual method additionally takes into account capital outflows that are more long-term in nature.
Third, the capital flight measure proposed by Dooley (1986) also aims at measuring abnormal or illegal capital outflows. Dooley defines capital flight as all capital outflows based on the desire to place assets beyond the control of domestic authorities, excluding normal outflows. Consequently, this measure includes all capital outflows that do not receive and/or register interest payments.
However, Claessens and Naudé (1993, pp.5-7) show that the calculation of capital flight as proposed by Dooley (1986) is in fact also at least partly based on the residual approach, although he uses a different concept of capital flight. Therefore, the Dooley method gives rather identical magnitudes of capital flight as compared to those for the residual method. 3 Table 1 shows the correlation  matrix of the three capital flight measures and confirms the similarity between   the Morgan and Dooley measures. <insert Table 1> 3. Magnitude of Capital Flight Figure 1 presents the annual flow of capital flight for 84 developing countries during the 1971-1991 period. 4 The figure provides capital flight data according to three methods of measurement: the Morgan Guaranty method, the hot money method and the Dooley method. The Morgan Guaranty method is used here to represent the residual method of measuring capital flight, since the most widely used variation on this measure follows Morgan Guaranty (1986) . The annual flows measured according to the Morgan Guaranty and Dooley methods show similar patterns. This may be expected, since as discussed in the previous section, both methods -although conceptually different -measure capital flight using the same data definitions. The annual flows measured according to the hot money method differ in two respects from those based on the other two methods. First, the flows based on the hot money method fluctuate less severely.
Second, hot money flows turn negative after 1985, whereas for the other measures this is the case only after 1988. Nevertheless, the general trend of the overinvoicing, since both these malpractices provide channels to siphon domestically accumulated wealth outside the country (Gulati, 1987; Lessard and Williamson, 1987; Vos, 1990) . However, there are good reasons for not using trade misinvoicing as a measure of capital flight, since trade misinvoicing may also occur as a reaction to the presence of trade taxes. Calculated trade misinvoicing may therefore be unrelated to the phenomenon of capital flight (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1993, p.150) . Other studies have taken the total stock of capital held outside the country by non-bank residents as a measure of capital flight; this is the so-called asset method (Hermes and Lensink, 1992 ). Yet, data for calculating the asset method are available only from 1981 onwards. For these reasons, both trade misinvoicing and the asset method are not taken into account in this study. flows for all the three measures presented in Figure 1 shows a similar pattern for most of the 1971-1991 period.
<insert Figure 1> 
Estimation Procedure and Results
The central hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that political risk stimulates framework for guiding our empirical work. No single model exists that completely specifies the variables that may be held constant in order to investigate the impact of political risk on capital flight. The most commonly employed empirical procedure consists of running regressions of the following form:
where CF is the vector of capital flight, and y 1 ...y n are different explanatory variables. These explanatory variables vary across the different empirical investigations available in the literature.
In order to investigate the impact of political variables on capital flight, we use a procedure that follows the so-called Barro tradition that has been hitherto used mainly in studies on endogenous growth (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997) . Generally, the procedure consists of crosssection regressions. To be able to treat political risk as the variable of interest, and allow for testing the sensitivity of political variables to alterations in the conditioning set of variables that have been mentioned in the literature to be related to capital flight, we use a variant of Leamer's extreme bounds analysis (EBA) following Levine and Renelt (1992) , as well as a (less strict) sensitivity test suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997). Both these tests will be explained below.
First, however, the design of our empirical analysis is discussed in more detail.
In the analysis we use the following cross-section regression: <insert Table 2> As a second step in the estimation procedure, a number of variables proxying political (in)stability and risk is selected to augment the basic model. These RIGHTS, the higher the value of the dummy, the higher is the extent of political instability in a particular country assumed to be. This means that for these three variables the relationship with capital flight should be positive. With respect to DEMOC and PARCOM, the higher the value of the dummy, the more political rights residents of a country have. Thus, for these two variables the relationship with capital flight should be negative. Finally, the variable WAR is 0 if a country did not participate in a war during the entire estimation period.
The use of INSTAB and WAR as variables to measure political instability might be clear. They aim to measure directly the extent of political instability a country has been confronted with, by focusing on issues such as the number of revolutions, assassinations and war incidents. The variables CIVIL, RIGHTS, DEMOC, and PARCOM indirectly measure political instability. These variables focus on the existence (or absence) of political freedom, which can be seen as a measure of the potential of the occurrence of political instability in a country.
The absence of political freedom is seen as an important source of the occurrence of political instability. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the various political variables. As is clear from the table, multicollinearity between some of these political risk variables appears to be relatively high.
<insert Table 3> Tables 4A -4C <insert Tables 4A-4C>   9 The third step in the estimation procedure involves testing the robustness of the results presented in Tables 4A-4C . This entails carrying out the robustness tests suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) . To begin with, the estimations as presented in Tables 4A to 4C are We now come to explaining the robustness tests in more detail. The procedure of the EBA suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992) is as follows. For each regression j, we find an estimate β mj and a standard deviation σ mj for each political variable m. The lower extreme bound is the lowest value of β mj -2σ mj , whereas the upper bound is β mj + 2σ mj . The extreme bounds test for variable M involves the degree of confidence we accept on the partial correlations between <insert Tables 5A-5C> Sala-i-Martin (1997a) criticizes the EBA analysis of Levine and Renelt (1992) for using too strict a robustness test and presents an alternative stability analysis. We agree with his criticism of the EBA. Taking the EBA seriously means that a relationship between two variables is already considered to be fragile if just one regression out of many (7,315 in our case) is responsible for the change in the sign of the coefficient.
Instead, the approach taken by Sala-i-Martin is based on looking at the entire distribution of the coefficient β, instead of a zero-one (robust-fragile) decision, and calculating the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on each side of zero. By assuming that the distribution of the estimates of the coefficients is normal and calculating the mean and the standard deviation of this distribution, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be calculated. His methodology starts by computing the point-estimates of β and the standard deviation σ. Next, the mean estimate of β and the average variance are calculated as: 12
The mean estimate of β and the average standard error are the mean and the standard deviation of the assumed normal distribution. Finally, by using a table for the (cumulative) normal distribution, it can be calculated which fraction of the cumulative distribution function is on the right or left hand side of zero. 
Conclusions
The empirical analysis in this paper is the first serious attempt to examine the (1997) is applied. When we apply the EBA proposed by Levine and Renelt (1992) , no 13 Since, in principle, it is arbritrary to do the above described stability test using combinations of four variables, we also did the stability test by including all combinations of three Z variables. In this case the number of regressions for every political variable equals 1,540. The results of this analysis are similar to the regressions carried out with combinations of four variables. The results using combinations of three Z variables are available on request from the authors. 
